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THE "OREGON PLAN" AND THE ADA:
TOWARD RECONCILIATION
INTRODUCTION
Americans spend over $733 billion on health care each year.' As
a result, the United States has the finest physicians and medical cen-
ters in the world.' Unfortunately, an increasing number of Ameri-
cans are effectively denied access to these superior medical services
because they cannot afford to pay the high costs.3 The results are
devastating. The United States ranks twelfth in the world in life ex-
pectancy 4 and has one of the highest infant mortality rates among
industrialized nations.5
In spite of these problems, the United States is one of the only
industrialized nations that fails to offer its citizens a universal health
care program. 6 Medicaid is the closest alternative, but rising health
care costs have forced many states to drastically reduce the number
of eligible recipients.7 As a result, over thirty-seven million Ameri-
cans are presently uninsured! These individuals can only hope that
they will never require medical treatment.
1. Janice Castro, Condition: Critical, TIME, Nov. 25, 1991, at 34, 34-35.
2. B.D. Colen, Strong Medicine, HEALTH, May 1991, at 32.
3. Eric L. Robinson, Note, The Oregon Basic Health Services Act: A Model for
State Reform?, 45 VAND. L. REv. 977, 979 (1992).
4. The Health Care Crisis and the American Family: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 64 (1991).
5. Id.
6. Colen, supra note 2, at 32. South Africa is the only other industrialized coun-
try which does not offer its citizens universal health care coverage. Id.
7. Daniel M. Fox & Howard M. Leichter, Rationing Care in Oregon: The New
Accountability, HEALTH AiF., Summer 1991, at 7, 12-14.
8. Castro, supra note 1, at 36.
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In an effort to reverse this unjust trend, several states have taken
the initiative in developing programs that increase accessibility to
health care services.9 Oregon has assumed a leading role in this ef-
fort.10 Oregon's innovative plan extends insurance coverage to
ninety-seven percent of its population by rationing health care.11 If
effective, the "Oregon Plan" would serve as a model for other states
as well as a viable solution to the national health care crisis.1 2
To implement its bold plan, Oregon needs to obtain federal waiv-
ers under the Social Security Act.'3 The Bush Administration de-
nied Oregon's waiver application, claiming that the plan would
violate the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).' 4 In response,
Oregon revised its plan to comport with the ADA.'" The Clinton
Administration granted Oregon's waiver application, provided Ore-
gon makes certain changes to the prioritization process. 16
This Note examines the current relationship between the Oregon
Basic Health Services Act (OBHSA) and the ADA. Part I of this
Note outlines the OBHSA and its controversial original prioritiza-
tion methodology. Part II examines the key components of the
ADA. Part III sets forth the rationale behind the Bush Administra-
9. OREGON HEALTH SERVICES COMM'N, PRIORrrIZATION OF HEALTH SERV-
IcEs: A REPORT TO THE GOVEmOR AND LEGISLATURE 5 (1991) [hereinafter 1991
COMM'N REPORT].
Alaska has adopted an "elimination" list designating categories of health care that
can be eliminated should the financial need arise. Id. Alaska is the only state other
than Oregon to rank heath care services. Id. Other states which have attempted to
contain health care costs include California, Hawaii, Massachusetts, New York, and
Washington. Id.
10. See, e.g., David M. Eddy, What's Going on in Oregon?, 266 JAMA 417, 417
(1991) [hereinafter What's Going On?].
11. David M. Eddy, Oregon's Plan: Should it be Approved?, 266 JAMA 2349,
2441 (1991) [hereinafter Oregon's Plan].
12. Colen, supra note 2, at 84. Eighteen states are currently using the "Oregon
Plan" as a model. Id. Furthermore, Britain and Canada are also considering the
plan as a possible solution to their health care problems. Timothy Egan, For Ore-
gon's Health Care System, Triage By a Lawmaker with an M.D., N.Y. TIMES, June 9,
1991, at A18.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1988).
14. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp IV 1992); U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVICES, ANALYSIS UNDER THE AMERICANS WrrIH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA) OF
THE OREGON REFORM DEMONSTRATION (1992) [hereinafter DHHS REPORT].
15. OREGON HEALTH SERVICES COMM'N, THE OREGON HEALTH PLAN RE-
VISED PRIORITY PROCESS (1992) [hereinafter OHSC REVISION].
16. See infra notes 279-87 and accompanying text.
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tion's rejection of Oregon's waiver application. Part IV analyzes
Oregon's revised prioritization process in light of the ADA. Part V
explores the Oregon waiver and the required changes in the priori-
tization process. Finally, Part VI proposes a balancing test for
courts to use when confronted with a conflict between the OBHSA
and the ADA.
I. THE OREGON BASIC HEALTH SERVICES Acr
A. Medicaid: A Brief Overview
Medicaid is a federal health care program that covers the medical
expenses of qualified low income and medically needy persons. 7
Individuals must meet their state's pre-set financial requirements to
qualify for Medicaid's basic benefits package.'" This package in-
cludes: inpatient hospital services, outpatient hospital services, labo-
ratory and X-ray services, and mid-wife services.' 9
The federal and state governments jointly finance this program
under the Social Security Act. 0 A state is eligible to receive federal
funds21 provided it follows federal statutory and regulatory guide-
lines.22 The amount of federal assistance ranges from fifty to eighty
cents for each state Medicaid dollar spent.' This is known as the
federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP).24
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396u (1988 & Supp. 111991). See Mary 0. Waid, Adden-
dum: A Brief Summary of the Medicaid Program, in H-IALTH CARE FINANCING
REv. 171-72 (Ann. Supp. 1990) (discussing the complete history of Medicaid).
18. 42 C.F.R. §§ 435.1 to -.1009 (1992) (providing a regulatory scheme under
which states may vary coverage). In Oregon, the Medicaid eligibility amount is $420
per month for a family of four. Colen, supra note 2, at 33.
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10), 1396d(a)(1)-(5), (17), (21).
20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1397e (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
21. Robinson, supra note 3, at 982.
22. Sara Rosenbaum, Mothers and Children Last: The Oregon Medicaid Experi-
ment, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 97, 99 (1992). These guidelines prevent alteration to
either the basic benefit package or the distribution system without federal govern-
ment approval. For a detailed description of these guidelines, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a). Sometimes the federal government will grant waivers to state govern-
ments trying an experimental project. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (setting forth conditions
for the waiver).
23. Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 100.
24. Id. Oregon's 1991 FMAP was 63.5%. Id.
1994]
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Since Congress introduced Medicaid in 1965, the cost of health
care has skyrocketed.25 As a result, state Medicaid expenditures
have increased dramatically.26 Medicaid consumes an average of
eleven percent of most state budgets,27 and is expected to pass fif-
teen percent within the next two years.-8 To combat this growing
financial burden, many states have decided to revamp their Medi-
caid distribution systems.29
Under the current Medicaid plan, a state may implement its own
distribution system provided it obtains the necessary waivers under
the Social Security Act.30 Although the Act requires waivers for a
state to alter funding of mandatory Medicaid services,31 waivers are
unnecessary to eliminate optional services.32 For example, a state
wishing to redefine its basic benefits package must obtain waivers,33
but does not need waivers to eliminate soft-tissue transplants.
3 4
Waivers are granted either administratively by the Health Care Fi-
nancing Administration (HCFA) or statutorily by Congress.35 If the
25. Robinson, supra note 3, at 979. In 1991, the United States spent 12.3% of its
GNP on health care, compared to 9A% in 1980. Id. While the United States spends
50% more of its GNP on health care than any other major country, a substantial
number of its citizens cannot afford access to health care services. Id.
26. lt at 988.
27. Id. In 1965, this figure was only 5%. Id.
28. Id.
29. Robinson, supra note 3, at 983. To cope with the rising costs of health care,
most states have lowered the maximum allowable income to levels far below the
federal poverty line (FPL), reducing the number of individuals Medicaid covers. Id.
As a result, over 60% of the poor (i.e., those whose incomes fall below the FPL)
qualified for Medicaid in 1980, while less than 40% qualify today. Id.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a). However, the federal government has never granted a
waiver allowing a state to abolish services within the Medicaid basic benefits pack-
age. Lawrence D. Brown, The National Politics of Oregon's Rationing Plan,
HEALTH AFF., Summer 1991, at 28, 33.
31. 1991 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at 40.
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a); cf. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(9)-(10). Optional services in-
clude clinical services, dental services, home health care services, private nursing
services, and soft-tissue transplants. § 1396d(a)(7)-(10), (12).
33. § 1315(a); cf. 1991 COMM'N REPoRT, supra note 9, at 40.
34. 42 C.F.R. §§ 485.301-.308 (1992) (providing that states may use Medicaid
funds to support "organ procurement organizations" provided the organizations
meet regulatory guidelines).
35. What's Going On?, supra note 10, at 417.
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federal government denies the waiver, the state cannot implement
its program without risking the loss of its FMAlP.36
B. History of the OBHSA
By 1987, the rising costs of health care prompted the Oregon Leg-
islature to reallocate its scarce Medicaid funds.37 With only $21 mil-
lion to pay for $48 million in critical social programs,38 Oregon
decided to eliminate optional Medicaid services such as soft-tissue
transplants.39 Rather than spend $1.1 million on soft-tissue trans-
plants for an average of 11 people per year 40 the legislature redi-
rected the funds toward prenatal care for over 1500 women.4' To
justify this decision, Oregon claimed that funding prenatal care
would save more lives.42
The legislature's "adjustment" of fund allocation soon came
under severe scrutiny. In December of 1987, a seven-year-old boy
named Coby Howard was refused funding for a potentially life-say-
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1396(c); see also 42 C.F.R. § 430.35 (1992). Without federal fi-
nancial assistance, states would be unable to fund their Medicaid programs.
37. See Norman Daniels, Is the Oregon Rationing Plan Fair?, 265 JAMA 2232,
2232 (1991). An Oregon citizens' group called Oregon Health Decisions (OHD)
strongly influenced this decision. Id. at 2234. OHD conducted meetings for the
general public about the status of state health care. Id. The survey found that most
people in Oregon wanted Medicaid expanded to guarantee universal access to basic
care, rather than provide expensive procedures for a few. Id. The results of this
survey influenced the Legislature's decision to reallocate its Medicaid funds. Id. at
2235.
38. What's Going On?, supra note 10, at 417.
39. Id. Only 38 states funded liver transplants, and only 40 states funded heart
transplants in 1990. Spencer Rich, Organ Transplants: Rationing by Wallet?, WASH.
PosT, Sept. 1, 1991, at Al.
40. Colen, supra note 2, at 33.
41. Id.
42. Robinson, supra note 3, at 989. See also Daniels, supra note 37, at 2232
(claiming that the consequences of ignoring the need for prenatal care are much
worse than the consequences of refusing to fund transplants for a few children).
Prenatal care is a form of preventative health care. One California study illus-
trates the importance of access to preventive health care. Victor Cohn, Rationing
Medical Care, WASH. PosT, July 31, 1990, at Z10. In 1982, California dropped
270,000 people from its Medicaid program to fund organ transplants. Id. After
monitoring two groups of 186 people, the study concluded that California's change
in policy may have caused between 5,000 and 10,000 deaths. Id. Most of these
deaths may have been prevented, as they resulted from lack of medicine for diabetes
and high blood pressure. Id.
1994]
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ing bone marrow transplant.43 After raising $80,000 of the $100,000
needed for the operation, Coby died of leukemia. 44 This highly pub-
licized incident forced the Oregon Legislature to re-examine its en-
tire Medicaid distribution system.45
In 1988, Medicaid was only available to Oregon residents who did
not have a pre-existing medical condition46 and who earned less
than fifty-two percent of the federal poverty level.47 These stringent
standards left over 400,000 Oregonians without insurance.48 Thus, a
family of four struggling to survive on $541 per month was consid-
ered "too rich" to qualify for Medicaid, even though private insur-
ance would drain over $200 per month from the family's meager
funds.49
Realizing that "the public and private sectors no longer could af-
ford to pay for everyone to receive all desired health care serv-
ices,"50 the Oregon Legislature passed the Oregon Basic Health
Services Act (OBHSA).5 1 The OBHSA attempts to solve the prob-
lem of uninsured Oregonians by offering coverage to all Oregon res-
idents who fall below the federal poverty level. The OBHSA also
creates an insurance fund for up to 20,000 residents who were previ-
ously ineligible for health insurance because of pre-existing medical
conditions.52
43. Colen, supra note 2, at 33. See Harvey D. Klevit et al., Prioritization of
Health Care Services: A Progress Report by the Oregon Health Services Commission,
151 ARCHivES INTERNAL MED. 912, 912 (1991) (clarifying that Coby was not a good
candidate for a bone marrow transplant because his leukemia was not in remission).
44. What's Going On?, supra note 10, at 417.
45. Colen, supra note 2, at 33. Oregon's refusal to fund Coby's operation
prompted public criticism that Oregon was trying to save money at the expense of a
young boy's life. See Cohn, supra note 42.
46. Colen, supra note 2, at 33.
47. Id.
48. Id. The federal poverty line for a family of four is $5,040. Id. Only 162,000
of these people had any chance of qualifying for Medicaid. Id. "To continue to
withhold Medicaid eligibility from some 238,000 people, in order to offer extensive
benefits to a small portion of those in need, seemed morally questionable." Id.
(quoting John D. Golenski, Ph.D.).
49. What's Going On?, supra note 10, at 418.
50. Robinson, supra note 3, at 989.
51. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 414.705-.750 (Supp. 1992).
52. Robinson, supra note 3, at 994.
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C. Overview of the OBHSA
The OBHSA is a three part plan which would provide access to
basic health care for ninety-seven percent of Oregon's citizens.5 3
Senate Bill 935 offers coverage to over 330,000 employed Oregoni-
ans with incomes above the federal poverty level.5 4 To accomplish
this goal, the Bill offers tax incentives for employer-sponsored insur-
ance.55 Senate Bill 534 guarantees insurance to all employees with
incomes above the federal poverty level who do not qualify for em-
ployee-sponsored coverage. The Bill creates a state health-risk pool
to accomplish this goal. 6
The crux of the OBHSA is Senate Bill 27,17 which extends Medi-
caid coverage to almost all citizens below the federal poverty line.
This controversial bill established the Oregon Health Services Com-
mission (OHSC), an eleven-member group consisting of five doc-
tors, four health care consumers, one nurse, and one social worker.5 8
Every two years this group will create a list of various medical con-
ditions and corresponding treatments.59
Initially, OHSC compiled a list of 709 condition/treatment pairs.6 0
OHSC ranked these pairs according to the treatment's importance
53. See Oregon's Plan, supra note 11, at 2441.
54. Robinson, supra note 3, at 995. Senate Bill 27 covers those who are below
the federal poverty level. See infra notes 57-67 and accompanying text for a descrip-
tion of Senate Bill 27.
55. Robinson, supra note 3, at 995. Under Senate Bill 27, all employers with
fewer than twenty-five employees are eligible for tax credits if they have not pro-
vided health insurance during the past two years. This bill authorizes the Legislature
to eventually extend the plan to all employers, regardless of the number of employ-
ees. Id. All employers who qualify must provide "an insurance package at least
equal to those funded by the state through Medicaid." Id.
56. Id. at 994. Risk pools offer coverage to people who are otherwise uninsur-
able because of a pre-existing medical condition. Up to 20,000 otherwise uninsur-
able Oregonians will receive coverage under this risk pool program. Id. For a
discussion of risk pools, see id. at 994 n.151.
57. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 414.705-.750 (Supp. 1992).
58. § 414.715. The composition of OHSC is statutorily mandated. Id. Senate
Bill 27 also expressly provides for a Subcommittee on the Elderly, Blind, and Dis-
abled for the purpose of assisting OHSC in "identifying special health needs of these
populations." Act of Aug. 5, 1991, ch. 753, § 7, 1991 Or. Laws 753. Members of
OHSC are limited to four year terms, and receive no compensation except necessary
travel expenses. § 414.715(2)-(3).
59. § 414.720.
60. Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 104. The HSC defined services as pairs of
medical conditions and the corresponding treatments. What's Going On?, supra
1994]
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in contributing to the patient's quality of life.61 OHSC then placed
each pair in one of seventeen service categories62 based on the ex-
pected benefit of the treatment. 63 For example, "treatable brain
cancer" (line 371) received higher priority than "traumatic brain in-
jury" (line 684) because of its greater benefit and contribution to the
quality of lifef Funding is on a priority basis until all cash re-
sources are depleted.6' Any item below the cut off line will not be
funded.66 Although the OHSC recommended coverage through
line 640, the Oregon Legislature decided to provide funding for only
the first 587 condition/treatment pairs.67
The most controversial aspect of the OBHSA is the method of
prioritization.6 s The following section examines the methods OHSC
employed in prioritizing the original list of condition/treatment
pairs.
note 10, at 417. The HSC defined conditions under the International Classification
of Diseases (ICD-9) codes. Id. Current Procedural Terminology (CPT-4) codes
were used to define treatments. Id. The HSC analyzed over 1,600 conditions before
creating the list of 709 condition/treatment pairs. Id. For a complete listing of pri-
oritized condition/treatment pairs, see 1991 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at app.
J.
61. Charles J. Dougherty, Setting Health Care Priorities; Oregon's Next Steps,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1991, at 1, 3. See also Rosenbaum, supra note
22, at 104. The pairs were prioritized "using a formula that considers the cost of the
treatment, the benefits to be obtained from the treatment, and the quality of life that
can be expected for an individual receiving the treatment for the particular condi-
tion in question." Id.
62. Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 104-05. See infra note 101 and accompanying
text for a detailed list of service categories.
63. Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 105.
64. Joseph P. Shapiro, To Ration or Not to Ration, U.S. NEWs & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 10, 1992, at 24.
65. Id. To contain costs, the bill requires the state to contract with pre-paid man-
aged care plans and simultaneously determine the level of reimbursement to physi-
cians. Dougherty, supra note 61, at 3.
66. Shapiro, supra note 64, at 24. Examples of condition/treatment pairs which
fall below the funding line include: post-mastectomy breast reconstruction (line
600), end-stage AIDS (line 702), and life support for a baby born with an incomplete
brain (line 709). Senate Bill 27 also protects health care providers from legal action
for refusing to provide non-funded services. Dougherty, supra note 61, at 3.
67. Rosenbaum, supra note 22, at 105.
68. See, e.g., Alexander M. Capron, Oregon's Disability: Principles or Politics?,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 18 (arguing that Oregon's prioritization
process is widely criticized for failing to cover many medically effective treatments).
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D. Priority-Setting Methodology
After OHSC compiled a complete list of medical conditions and
corresponding treatments,69 the group prioritized the various condi-
tion/treatment pairs7° to reflect public values on health care in Ore-
gon.71 OHSC actively solicited both individual and community
values. 2
OHSC obtained individual values through a random-sample tele-
phone survey of 1000 Oregonians.71 The participants evaluated var-
ious conditions on a scale of 0 (death) to 100 (good health),74
representing an estimate of the degree to which a given medical con-
dition would reduce the overall quality of life.75 Many questions
required the respondent to evaluate the quality of a life with
69. See 1991 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at app. J.
70. OR. REV. STAT. § 414.720(3) (Supp. 1992) (stating that "the Commissioner
shall report to the governor a list of health services, including health care services of
the aged, blind and disabled ... ranked by priority, from the most important to the
least important, representing the comparative benefits of each service to the entire
population served").
71. See § 414.720(2).
72. Robinson, supra note 3, at 991. OHSC is statutorily required to "actively
solicit public involvement in a community meeting process to build a consensus on
the values to be used to guide health resource allocation decisions." § 414.720(2).
73. Michael J. Garland, Rationing in Public: Oregon's Priority-Setting Methodol-
ogy, in RATIONING AmERICA'S HEALTH CARE: THm OREGON PLAN AND BEYoND
37, 44 (Martin A. Strosberg et al. eds., 1992).
74. David C. Hadorn, The Oregon Priority-Setting Exercise: Quality of Life and
Public Policy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May-June 1991, at 16. The participants were
only subjected to one hypothetical problem at a time. Id. See also Garland, supra
note 73, at 44 (observing that individual responses were purely hypothetical).
The following are examples of some of the questions asked in the telephone
survey:
You can be taken anywhere, but have to be in a bed or wheelchair controlled
by someone else, need help to eat or go to the bathroom, but have no other
health problems.
You cannot drive a car or use public transportation, you have to use a walker
or wheelchair under your own control, and are limited in the participation of
recreational activities. You have no other health problems.
You can go anywhere and have no limitation on physical or other activity, but
have drainage from your sexual organs and discomfort or pain.
You can go anywhere and have no limitations on physical or other activity,
but have trouble with sexual interest or performance.
1991 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at C-14, C-15. See also id. at C-13 to C-17.
75. Hadom, supra note 74, at 11, 14.
1994]
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debilitating conditions such as paralysis.76 OHSC aggregated the re-
suits to establish a standard individual value for each condition.77
Debilitating conditions received very low values.78 For example, the
three conditions with the lowest quality of life ratings were: confine-
ment to a bed or wheelchair controlled by someone else, alcoholism
and drug addiction, and use of a wheelchair or walker under one's
own control.79 OHSC used these results to create a quality-of-well-
being (QWB) scale, 0 which estimates the impact of certain treat-
ments on a patient's quality of life."' According to this scale, mod-
76. One of the scenarios provided: "You can go anywhere. You have difficulty
in walking because of a paralyzed or broken leg, but you have no other limitations
on activity." 1991 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at C-16.
77. Garland, supra note 73, at 44. But see Hadorn, supra note 74, at 16. Hadorn
argued that the telephone survey was inherently problematic because it only stipu-
lated one problem per hypothetical situation. Id. "Obviously, this assumption is
problematic, since illness and disability tend to occur together." Id. For example, it
is unrealistic to assume that a patient with third degree bums is unlimited in physical
mobility or social activity. Id.
78. See, e.g., 1991 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at C-9, C-10.
79. Id,
80. Robinson, supra note 3, at 993. Oregon's QWB scale is a modified version
of the QWB scale developed by Robert M. Kaplan. See, e.g., Robert M. Kaplan, A
Quality-of-Life Approach to Health Resource Allocation, in RATIONING AMERICA'S
HEALTH CARE: THE OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND 60 (Martin A. Strosberg et al.
eds., 1992) (applying the QWB scale to the Oregon Plan); Robert M. Kaplan &
James Bush, Health-Related Quality of Life Measurement for Evaluation Research
and Policy Analysis, 1 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 61-80 (1982) (outlining Kaplan's original
QWB test).
81. Robinson, supra note 3, at 993. Some health care specialists have quantified
the QWB scale with a priority-setting process called the "quality-adjusted life year"
(QALY) approach. Hadorn, supra note 74, at 13. The QALY approach integrates
quality of well being considerations with estimates of life expectancy. Results are
quantified on a "percentage of normal quality of life" basis (i.e., two years of "one-
half normal" life are equivalent to one year of normal life). Id.
There are three main criticisms of the QALY approach. First, it assumes that a
short, good life is equivalent to a long, unhealthy life. Id. at 14. Second, the ap-
proach favors treating one person who stands to gain ten QALYs, rather than treat-
ing nine people who will each gain one QALY. Id. Third, quantification of an
"amorphous and ill-defined" factor, such as quality of life, is inherently difficult and
subject to inaccuracies. Id.
For more information about QALYs, see generally John Harris, Qualifying the
Value of Life, 13 J. MED. ETHIcs 117 (1987); Graham Loomes & Lynda McKenzie,
The Use of QALYs in Health Care Decision Making, 28 Soc. Sc. & MED. 299
(1989); Jacob Najman & Sol Levine, Evaluating the Impact of Medical Care and
Technologies on the Quality of Life: a Review and Critique, 15 Soc. Sci. & MED. 107
(1981); Warren Reich, Life: Quality of Life, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Bionri-Iics, 829,
837 (1978).
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erate physical limitations were estimated to reduce the overall
quality of life by thirty-seven percent.8
A non-profit community group called Oregon Health Decisions
(OHD) helped OHSC obtain information on community values.8 3
Between January and March 1990, OHSC and OHD conducted 47
community meetings involving over 1000 Oregonians.' Unlike the
telephone survey, these meetings ascertained health care values im-
portant to the community as a whole.85 In addition to these meet-
ings, OHSC held public hearings on health care.86 The telephone
survey, community meetings, and public hearings produced a gen-
eral consensus of thirteen health care related values.87
82. Hadorn, supra note 74, at 14. Seizures, fainting, and comas were estimated
to reduce the overall quality of life by 11%. Id.
83. Michael J. Garland & Romana Hasnain, Health Care in Common: Setting
Priorities in Oregon, HAsTINGS CENTrrn REP., Sept.-Oct. 1990, at 16, 17. See supra
note 37 for a discussion of the OHD.
84. Garland & Hasnain, supra note 83, at 17. These meetings were largely ho-
mogenous: 93% of the participants were Caucasian; 70% were college educated;
over 50% were between 21 and 50 years old; and 33% had household incomes of
over $50,000. Id. See also Daniels, supra note 37, at 2234 (arguing that the commu-
nity meeting procedure did not "involve a representative cross section of
Oregonians").
85. Garland & Hasnain, supra note 83, at 17. To this end, each community meet-
ing consisted of several small group discussions in which the participants identified
the "values that guided their priorities." Id. The small groups subsequently joined
to determine which values would accurately depict the consensus of the community
as a whole. Id.
86. See OR. REV. STAT. § 414.720 (Supp. 1992) (requiring OHSC to use public
hearings as a basis for prioritizing the list of condition/treatment pairs).
87. 1991 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at 21. The values were:
prevention (avoiding harm and suffering, improving quality of life, and exer-
cising wisdom and personal choice);
quality of life (attending to emotional well-being, pain and suffering, inde-
pendence, and functional capacity);
cost-effectiveness (wise investment in health);
ability to function (restoration of emotional well-being, productivity, inde-
pendence, and general quality of life);
equity (contributing to fairness of community life);
effectiveness of treatment (preference for treatments that are known to
work);
benefits many (seeking to treat problems affecting a large proportion of the
community);
mental health and chemical dependency (connection between mental and
physical health in support of functional ability and productivity);
personal choice (preservation of autonomy and personal dignity);
1994]
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OHSC used these values to construct seventeen general catego-
ries of health care, 8 and devised prioritization criteria by which to
rank these categories.8 9 It consolidated the thirteen value themes 90
into three broad criteria:9 value to society,92 value to the individual
at risk,93 and essential to basic care.94 The OHSC commissioners
assigned a weight to each criteria,95 and then individually judged all
17 categories under the three criteria.96 After a group discussion 97
concerning the accuracy of the scores in light of the community
community compassion (seeking to ensure humane response to the terminally
ill and other vulnerable persons);
impact on society (attending to effects of treatment on others);
length of life (acknowledging that life is necessary to realize any values);
personal responsibility (encouraging individual autonomy and control over
one's own health).
Id. at app. F, 9-24.
88. See infra note 101 for prioritized listing of the 17 categories.
89. Garland, supra note 73, at 47. See also infra notes 91-111 and accompanying
text.
90. See supra note 87 for a listing of the 13 value themes.
91. Garland, supra note 73, at 47. See also Paul T. Menzel, Oregon's Denial:
Disabilities and Quality of Life, HASTrNGs CENTER REP., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 21, 22
(enumerating the three criteria).
92. "Value to society" is defined as "comprising the values of prevention, benefit
to many, impact on society, quality-of-life impact, personal responsibility, cost-effec-
tiveness, community compassion, and response to mental health and chemical de-
pendency problems." Garland, supra note 73, at 47.
93. "Value to the individual at risk" is defined as "comprising the values of pre-
vention, quality of life, ability to function, length of life, personal responsibility, eq-
uity, effectiveness of treatment, personal choice, community compassion, and
response to mental health and chemical dependency problems." Id.
94. "Essential to basic care" is defined as "comprising the values of prevention,
benefit to many, quality-of-life impact, cost-effectiveness, and impact on society."
Id.
95. Menzel, supra note 91, at 22. "Value to society" was assigned a weight of 40.
Id. "Value to the individual at risk" was assigned a weight of 20. Id. "Essential to
basic care" was assigned a weight of 40. Id.
96. Garland, supra note 73, at 47. The commissioners individually scored each
of the service categories using a 1 (lowest) to 10 (highest) scale. Id.
97. After the group discussion, the commissioners were allowed to change their
scores. Id. However, during the course of the discussion, the commissioners
stressed their role as representatives of the people. Id.
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meetings,98 telephone survey,99 and public hearings,"°° the commis-
sioners ranked the seventeen categories by number. 1 '
98. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
100. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
101. The 17 categories were ranked as follows:
1. Acute fatal, prevents death, full recovery. Examples: Repair of deep, open
wounds of neck, appendectomy for appendicitis, medical therapy for myocardis;
2. Maternity care (including care for newborn in first 28 days of life). Exam-
ples: Obstetrical care for pregnancy, medical therapy for drug reactions and
intoxications specific to newborns, medical therapy for low birth weight babies;
3. Acute fatal, prevents death without full recovery. Examples: Surgical
treatment for head injury with prolonged loss of consciousness, medical therapy
for acute bacterial meningitis, reduction of open joint fractures;
4. Preventive care for children. Examples: Immunizations, medical therapy
for streptococcal sore throat and scarlet fever (reduces disabilities, prevents
spread), screening for specific problems such as vision or hearing problems, or
anemia;
5. Chronic fatal, improves life span and QWB (Quality of Well-Being). Ex-
amples: Medical therapy for Type I Diabetes Mellitus and asthma, medical and
surgical treatment for treatable cancer of the uterus, medical therapy for
asthma;
6. Reproductive services (excluding maternity and infertility). Examples:
contraceptive management, vasectomy, tubal ligation;
7. Comfort care. Examples: Palliative therapy for conditions in which death
is eminent;
8. Preventive dental (children and adults); Example: Cleaning and fluoride;
9. Preventive care for adults (A-B-C). Examples: Mammograms, blood pres-
sure screening, medical therapy and chemoprophylaxis for primary tuberculosis;
10. Acute nonfatal, return to previous health. Examples: Medical therapy for
acute thyroiditis, medical therapy for vaginitis, restorative dental service for
dental cares;
11. Chronic nonfatal, one time treatment improves QWB. Examples: Hip re-
placement, laser surgery for diabetic retinopathy, medical therapy for rheumatic
fever;
12. Acute nonfatal, without return to previous health. Examples: Relocation
of dislocated elbow, arthroscopic repair of internal derangement of knee, repair
of corneal laceration;
13. Chronic nonfatal, repetitive treatment improves QWB. Examples: Medi-
cal therapy for chronic sinusitis, medical therapy for migraine, medical therapy
for psoriasis;
14. Acute nonfatal, expedites recovery. Examples: Medical therapy for dia-
per rash, acute conjunctivitis, medical therapy for acute pharynges;
15. Infertility services. Examples: Medical therapy for anovulation,
microsurgery for tubal disease, in-vitro fertilization;
16. Preventive care for adults (D-E). Examples: Dipstick urinalysis for hema-
turia in adults less than 60 years of age, sigmoidoscopy for persons less than 40
years of age, screening of nonpregnant adults for Type I Diabetes Mellitus;
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OHSC subdivided the seventeen ranked categories into three
groups. 0 2 The first group (categories 1-9) was classified as "essen-
tial."'1 3 The categories of the second group (10-13) were "very im-
portant."'" The third group (categories 14-17) consisted of
treatments deemed "valuable to certain individuals."' 0 5
OHSC subsequently placed each of the 709 condition/treatment
pairs' 0 6 into one of the 17 health care categories." 7 The Commis-
sion used both outcome data from medical experts and the QWB
scale 10 8 to calculate a "net benefit" for each treatment pair.10 9 The
Commission prioritized each of the 709 treatment pairs within its
category using the "net benefit" information.110 "Hand Adjust-
ment" of the final list compensated for any unreasonable results. 111
17. Fatal or nonfatal, minimal or no improvement in QWB (non-self-limited).
Examples: Repair fingertip avulsion that does not include fingernail, medical
therapy for gallstones without cholecystitis, medical therapy for viral warts.
Dougherty, supra note 61, at 10.
102. Menzel, supra note 91, at 22. The categories were ranked according to the
mean score for each category. Garland, supra note 73, at 48. The mean score was
determined by dividing the sum of the weighted scores by the number of commis-
sioners. Id
103. Menzel, supra note 91, at 22. See supra note 101 for a list of categories 1-9.
104. Menzel, supra note 91, at 22. See supra note 101 for a list of categories 10-
13.
105. Menzel, supra note 91, at 22. See supra note 101 for a list of categories 14-
17.
106. See 1991 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at app. J (enumerating complete
prioritized list of the 709 condition/treatment pairs).
107. Dougherty, supra note 61, at 10. See supra note 101 for a list of the 17
health care categories.
108. See supra note 80 and accompanying text for a discussion of the QWB
scale; see also Hadorn, supra note 74, at 11 (claiming that "[e]stimates of how treat-
ments affect quality of life were by far the single most important factor in determin-
ing the priority order on that list."). Id.
109. Garland, supra note 73, at 49. "The net-benefit ratio is obtained by sub-
tracting the probable outcome if a condition was not treated from the probable out-
come of treating a given condition." Id.
110. Id. OHSC obtained probability estimates from 54 expert panels. Id. at 48-
49. Each panel member based his or her findings on five factors: 1) the median age
at the onset of the diagnosis; 2) the probability of use of designated treatment; 3)
expected duration of benefits; 4) expected outcomes both with and without treat-
ment; and 5) cost to payer both with and without treatment. Id. at 48.
111. See infra notes 112-21 and accompanying text.
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E. Hand Adjustments
After prioritizing the list of 709 condition/treatment pairs, OHSC
noticed that some of the items were "out of place.""' 2 OHSC com-
missioners "hand adjusted""' 3 anomalous rankings using a reasona-
bleness test."14 The test focused on six considerations: the impact on
public health, the cost of medical treatment, the frequency of the
condition, the effectiveness of treatment, the cost of nontreatment,
and the social costs involved." 5 As a general rule, the commission-
ers favored preventive over rehabilitative treatment for a given
condition. 1 6
OHSC adjusted forty percent of the condition/treatment pairs by
at least fifty places. 1 7 According to a congressional Office of Tech-
nology Assessment (OTA) Report, however, the personal judg-
ments of the commissioners "overshadowed the initial net-benefit-
based rankings.""" In other words, the personal values of the
OHSC commissioners ultimately determined the final priorities."19
After completing the adjustments, OHSC submitted the revised list
of 709 prioritized treatment pairs to the Oregon Legislature for
112. Garland, supra note 73, at 49. For example, treatments for thumb-sucking
and acute headaches were ranked ahead of treatments for cystic fibrosis and AIDS.
Jack H. Nagel, Combining Deliberation and Fair Representation in Community
Health Decisions, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1965, 1977 n.41 (1992). See also Norman Dan-
iels, Justice and Health Care Rationing: Lessons from Oregon, in RATIONING
AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE: THE OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND 185, 192 (1992) (ac-
knowledging that "reproductive services (excluding infertility), preventive medical
services, and dental services were given priority over some medical or surgical treat-
ments for various serious, but not fatal, conditions").
For more information on the ranking problems of the initial list, see generally
Timothy Egan, Oregon Shakes Up Pioneering Health Plan for the Poor, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 22, 1991, at A12; Virginia Morell, Oregon Puts Bold Health Plan on Ice, 249
SCIENCE 468, 468 (1990); Bruce C. Vladeck, Unhealthy Rations, AM. PROSPECr,
Summer 1991, at 101, 102.
113. E.g., Garland, supra note 73, at 49.
114. Id. at 49.
115. Id. at 49-50. See also Menzel, supra note 91, at 22 (enumerating the factors
of the reasonableness test).
116. Garland, supra note 73, at 50.
117. Nagel, supra note 112, at 1979.
118. Oregon Medicaid Rationing Experiment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health and the Env't of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. 175-76 (1991) (testimony of Clyde J. Behney, Health Program Manager, OTA).
119. Id.
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funding. 2 ' On June 30, 1991, the legislature approved funding for
the first 587 treatment pairs. 2 '
F. Waiver Application
Before Oregon can implement the OB-SA, it must obtain fed-
eral waivers under the Social Security Act 122 from either Congress
or HCFA.1' Although Oregon needs a total of eleven waivers, two
are of paramount importance. 24 The first would allow Oregon to
expand coverage to all Oregonians below the federal poverty level
who would not otherwise qualify for Medicaid."2 The second
would allow Oregon to replace the implicit federal rationing scheme
with its explicit prioritized list of services.' 26 On August 19, 1991,
the Oregon Department of Human Resources submitted the
OBHSA Waiver Application to HCFA. 27
Although the original prognosis was positive, 28 the Department
of Justice notified HCFA129 in early 1992 of a possible conflict be-
tween the OBHSA and a new, powerful piece of legislation, the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).' 30 Because of this conflict,
120. E.g., Oregon's Plan, supra note 11, at 2349.
121. 1& The legislature compared the benefits to the costs of service, which ac-
tuaries estimated. Id. Many previously covered services were dropped, such as
treatments for bursitis, diaper rash, and the common cold. Id. According to David
M. Eddy, when the legislature drew the line for funding, "[it] was saying that serv-
ices above the line were deemed to be worth their costs to publicly mandated pro-
grams, even within the context of competing social needs, whereas services below
the line were not." Id.
122. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a) (1988).
123. What's Going On?, supra note 10, at 417.
124. Oregon's Plan, supra note 11, at 2439.
125. Id. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of why
some Oregonians who fall below the FPL do not qualify for Medicaid.
126. Oregon's Plan, supra note 11, at 2439. See supra notes 69-111 and accom-
panying text for a description of Oregon's prioritization methodology.
127. Oregon's Plan, supra note 11, at 2439.
128. Telephone Interview with Gail Wilensky, Former HCFA Administrator
(Feb. 7, 1993). See also Tnothy Egan, Oregon Seeks to Revive Health Care Ration-
ing Plan, N.Y. Timas, Aug. 14, 1992, at A17 [hereinafter Revive Health Care] (quot-
ing Gail Wilensky: "The plan would have been approved had it not been for the
legal opinion that it violated the Americans with Disabilities Act.").
129. Revive Health Care, supra note 128, at A17.
130. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. IV 1992). See infra notes 133-204 and ac-
companying text for a complete discussion of the ADA.
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Secretary of Health and Human Services Louis Sullivan formally re-
jected Oregon's waiver application on August 3, 1992,3 l claiming
that the OBHSA violated the ADA.
13 2
II. THE AMERICANS WrrIH DIsAILrrms Acr
A. History
During the development of the OBHSA, the National Council on
Disability began to devise the ADA, 3 3 an Act which seeks to elimi-
nate discrimination against disabled individuals.' 4 The ADA is es-
sentially an expanded version of section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act).' 35 Therefore, a brief examination
of section 504 and its subsequent history is necessary to understand
the ADA.
Section 504 prohibits discrimination on the basis of handicap in
any program or activity that receives federal funding.136 Section 504
131. DHHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 1.
132. Id. See infra notes 205-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of waiver
rejection.
133. Nancy Lee Jones, Essential Requirements of the Act A Short Historical
Overview, 69 MILBANK Q. 25, 27 (Supp. & 1991).
134. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (Supp. II 1990).
It is the purpose of this Act:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination
of discrimination against individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central role in enforcing the
standards established in this Act on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to en-
force the fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in order to address
the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.
Id.
135. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1973).
136. Jones, supra note 133, at 30. Section 504 also applies to executive agencies
and the U.S. Postal Service. Id.
Section 504 provides:
[N]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual.., shall, solely by reason of
his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance...
29 U.S.C. § 794.
This Note generally uses the word "disabled" rather than "handicapped" to reflect
the current accepted terminology. S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1989),
reprinted in BERNARD D. REAMS ET AL., DISABILITY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES at
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defines a handicapped person as an individual with a mental or
physical impairment which substantially limits a major life activ-
ity.'37 The definition also covers individuals who either have, or are
perceived as having, a medical history of such a condition. 13 8
Although section 504 protects the interests of handicapped individu-
als, the scope of its application remains unclear. 139
In 1985, the Supreme Court defined the scope of section 504 in
Alexander v. Choate. 4 ' In that case, Tennessee proposed to reduce
the number of hospital days Medicaid covered from twenty to four-
teen.141 Respondents argued that such a limitation violated section
504 because it would have a disproportionate effect on the handi-
capped. 42 The Court held that the fourteen-day limitation did not
violate section 504 because it was "neutral on its face" and did not
deny handicapped individuals access to Medicaid services. 143 The
Court reasoned that anti-discrimination statutes do not prevent the
government from limiting the scope of Medicaid programs because
the statutes "do not guarantee that each recipient will receive that
level of health care precisely tailored to his or her particular
doc. 2 (no pagination) (1992). However, the word "handicapped" is used when re-
ferring to the Rehabilitation Act in order to be consistent with the language of that
Act.
137. 29 U.S.C. § 706(7)(B) (1988). Section 504 defines a handicapped individual
as "any person who (i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially lim-
its one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such an
impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 29 U.S.C.
§ 706(7)(B).
For a discussion of "major life activities," see infra note 189.
138. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8) (1988).
139. Jones, supra note 133, at 32 (stating that "[s]ection 504 does not provide
bright lines or absolute rules .....
140. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
141. Id. at 289. In 1980, Tennessee's projected Medicaid costs exceeded the
state's Medicaid budget by $42 million. The directors of the Tennessee Medicaid
program decided to implement a variety of cost-saving measures. Id.
142. Id. at 289-90. During the 1979-80 fiscal year, 27.4% of all handicapped pa-
tients required more than 14 hospital days, while this figure was only 7.8% for non-
handicapped patients. Id. at 290. The respondents argued that any limitation of the
number of hospital days Medicaid covered would disproportionately disadvantage
handicapped patients. Id.
143. Id. at 309. The Court further argued that Tennessee has made health care
"equally accessible to both handicapped and nonhandicapped persons, and the state
is not required to assure the handicapped 'adequate health care' by providing them
with more coverage than the nonhandicapped." Id.
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needs."'" The Court concluded that the "reasonable accommoda-
tion"'145 element of section 504 requires balancing the rights of the
disabled with the continued integrity of federally-funded
programs. 146
After the Choate decision, several important reports concerning
discrimination against the disabled established the foundation for
the ADA. 4 7 In 1986, Congress directed the National Council on
Disability (Council)'4 to submit a report on the status of all federal
policies and programs affecting the disabled. 49 This report, entitled
Toward Independence, documented pervasive discrimination against
the disabled.150 In calling for a comprehensive law which provides
equal opportunity for disabled individuals,' 5 ' the report recom-
mended the creation of an omnibus Americans with Disabilities
Act.152
In 1986, a series of polls supported the findings of the Council's
report' 53 concerning the educational and socio-economic disadvan-
tages that most disabled Americans face.' 54 The results indicated
144. 469 U.S. 287, 303 (1985).
145. See infra note 169 for the definition of "reasonable accommodation" under
the ADA.
146. 469 U.S. at 300. But see Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442
U.S. 397, 405 (1979) (stating that an otherwise qualified handicapped individual
must be afforded meaningful access to the benefits of any federally-funded program
or activity).
147. Arlene Mayerson, The Americans with Disabilities Act: An Historic Over-
view, 7 LAB. LAW. 1, 3 (1991).
148. Id. The National Council on Disability is an independent federal agency.
Id.
149. Id. Congress directed the Council to make legislative recommendations
which would enhance the quality of life for disabled individuals. Id. To this end, the
Council held forums in every state. Id.
150. NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE: AN As-
SESSMENT oF FEDERAL LAWS AND PROGRAMS AFFEC-TING PERSONS wrrT DIsABILI-
TIES app. at A-3 (1986).
151. Id. at 18.
152. Mayerson, supra note 147, at 4.
153. Id. The polls were conducted by Louis Harris and Associates. Id. The
polls included: The ICD Survey of Disabled Americans: Bringing Disabled Ameri-
cans into the Mainstream (Mar. 1986); The ICD Survey II: Employing Disabled
Americans (1987), noted in Mayerson, supra note 147, at 4 n.11.
154. Mayerson, supra note 147, at 4. The polls found that disabled Americans
"are uniquely underprivileged and disadvantaged... [t]hey are much poorer, much
less well educated, and have less social life, have fewer amenities, and have a lower
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that disabled individuals do not have meaningful access to public
buildings, transportation, insurance, and education.155
The National Council on Disability issued a follow-up report enti-
tled On the Threshold of Independence, which proposed a bill ad-
dressing the above concerns.' 5 6 After some minor changes,15 7 this
bill was introduced to Congress in 1988 as the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act.'58 Following numerous committee hearings' 59 and bi-
partisan conferences,'1 6  the ADA passed the House on July 12,
1990,161 and the Senate the next day.'62 President Bush signed the
ADA on July 26, 1990.163 Most sections went into effect on July 26,
1992.164
level of satisfaction than other Americans." Id. (citing S. REP. No. 116, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1989)).
155. Mayerson, supra note 147, at 4. The report found that approximately 8.2
million disabled Americans wanted to work, but could not find employment. Id.
156. Id.
157. The original bill was revised to address big business concerns that the 1988
bill was too ambiguous and too strict. Id. at n.12.
158. Id. at 4.
159. In the House, the ADA was referred to four committees: Education and
Labor, Energy and Commerce, Transportation and Public Works, and Judiciary.
Jones, supra note 133, at 27-28. In the Senate, the ADA was referred to only one
committee, Labor and Human Resources. Id. at 28.
The congressional hearings produced several important findings. Over 43 million
Americans have one or more mental or physical disabilites. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1)
(Supp. 111990). This increasing number of Americans face discrimination on a daily
basis in such essential areas as health care, education, housing, employment, and
access to public services. § 12101(a)(3).
Although the nation's goals are to ensure equal opportunities for all Americans,
disabled individuals have not been afforded the same social, vocational, educational,
and economic opportunities as other Americans. § 12101(6),(8). Unlike victims of
race or sex discrimination, disabled individuals have heretofore been without legal
recourse. § 12101(4). Congress enacted the ADA to combat this "unfair and unnec-
essary" discrimination. § 12101(9).
160. Jones, supra note 133, at 28.
161. 136 CONG. Rac. H4582 (daily ed. July 12, 1990).
162. 136 CONG. RFc. S9695 (daily ed. July 13, 1990).
163. Jones, supra note 133, at 29.
164. Id. at 34-43. The effective date varies from section to section. Id.
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B. Overview of the ADA
The ADA extends the scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
disabled individuals.' 65 While the ADA embodies the principles of
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,166 it encompasses the
private sector as well as previously covered federally-funded
programs.167
Congress divided the ADA into five titles. Title I prohibits em-
ployment discrimination against a "qualified individual with a disa-
bility."' 68 The ADA entitles the disabled individual to "reasonable
accommodation"' 69 without creating "undue hardship" °7 0 on the
employer.' 7 1
165. Mayerson, supra note 147, at 7.
166. Id. For a discussion of section 504, see supra notes 136-39 and accompany-
ing text.
167. Jones, supra note 133, at 26-27.
168. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (Supp. IV 1992). For a complete definition of "disabil-
ity" under the ADA, see infra notes 186-204 and accompanying text.
The general rule is that "no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified
individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to
job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, em-
ployee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of
employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
"The term 'qualified individual with a disability' means an individual with a disa-
bility who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices
... meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the
participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity." § 12131(2).
169. § 12111(9). "Reasonable accommodation" means making the employment
facilities accessible and usable to disabled individuals, and "job restructuring, part-
time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or
modification of equipment .. devices ... examinations ... training materials or
policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accom-
modations for individuals with disabilities." Id.
For a complete discussion of the ADA's "reasonable accommodation" require-
ment, see C. Geoffrey Weirich, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 7 LAB. LAW. 27 (1991).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10). "The term 'undue hardship' means an action requir-
ing significant difficulty or expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth
in subparagraph (B)." § 12111(10)(A). These factors include the nature and cost of
the accommodation and the financial resources of the business. § 12111(10)(B).
For a complete discussion of "undue hardship," see Russell H. Gardner &
Carolyn J. Campanella, The Undue Hardship Defense to the Reasonable Accommo-
dation Requirement of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 7 LAB. LAW. 37
(1991).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). For further discussion of Title I, see Jones,
supra note 133, at 34-37.
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Title II prohibits discrimination against disabled individuals in the
administration of any services, programs, or activities of a public en-
tity.172 All state and local government agencies qualify as public en-
tities.173 Medicaid is a public service for the purposes of Title 11.174
Consequently, Title II covers the administration of state Medicaid
funds.175
Title III prohibits private entities from discriminating in the oper-
ation of public accommodations. 76 Public accommodations include
hotels, transportation, restaurants, bars, movie theaters, museums,
and schools, among others.'77
Title IV directs the Federal Communications Commission to pro-
vide telecommunication relay services for speech-impaired and
hearing-impaired individuals. 7 ' Furthermore, all federally-funded
public service announcements must include closed captioning. 179
Title V contains several miscellaneous provisions8 0 and explicitly
preserves the minimum standards established by the Rehabilitation
Act.'"' Another provision bars Titles I through IV from restricting
172. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (Supp. IV 1992). Title II provides that "no qualified indi-
vidual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participa-
tion in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." Id.
173. § 12131(1)(A), (B). The National Railroad Passenger Corporation also
qualifies as a public entity. Id. § 12131(1)(C). For provisions concerning public
transportation, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12141-12165.
174. See supra note 172 and accompanying text for text of relevant Title II
language.
175. This coverage was the basis of the DI-HS rejection of the OBHSA waiver
application. See infra notes 205-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
waiver rejection.
176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189. (Supp. IV 1992) The general rule is: "[n]o indi-
vidual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal
enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommoda-
tions of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or
leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation." § 12182(a).
177. § 12181(7). This is a partial listing. Note that the list does not include reli-
gious institutions. For a complete definition of "public accommodation," see 42
U.S.C. § 12181(7)(A)-(L).
178. Jones, supra note 133, at 39.
179. Id.
180. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (Supp. IV 1992).
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a) (stating that "[e]xcept as othenvise provided in
this Act, nothing in this Act shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the
standards applied under Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ... or the regula-
tions issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title") (citation omitted).
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or prohibiting insurers and administrators of health benefit plans
from traditional underwriting and risk assessment practices.182
However, this provision is not to be used to evade the purposes of
Titles I and III.183 Furthermore, Title V provides that states do not
have immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for violations of the
ADA. 84
Each of the preceding titles establishes different guidelines to pre-
vent discrimination against disabled individuals. 85 Together they
significantly expand section 504 to adequately protect the rights of
today's disabled citizens.
C. ADA Definition of Disability
The ADA bases its definition of disability on the standards set
forth by the Rehabilitation Act.'86 Under the ADA, three different
criteria classify an individual as a "person with a disability:"' 87 (1) a
mental or physical impairment" 8 which substantially limits that per-
son in major life activities;'89 (2) a record of such mental or physical
182. § 12201(c).
183. Id.
184. § 12202. This section provides that states are to be treated the same as any
other public or private entity, and as such, are subject to legal and equitable reme-
dies. Id.
185. See supra notes 168-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ADA
guidelines. For a more in depth examination of the various ADA provisions, see
Jones, supra note 133, at 34-42.
186. Chai R. Feldblum, The Americans with Disabilities Act Definition of Disa-
bility, 7 LAB. LAW. 11, 11 (1991). See supra notes 135-39 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
187. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
188. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) defines a
"physical or mental impairment" as "a physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic
disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting [any] neurological, musculoskeletal, re-
spiratory, cardiovascular, or reproductive system," to name a few. 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(h)(1) (1992). The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)
regulations provide examples of diseases and conditions which would be covered.
These include muscular dystrophy, multiple sclerosis, cancer, heart disease, diabetes,
cerebral palsy, epilepsy, drug addiction, and alcoholism. 45 C.F.R. app. A(3) § 84
(1992).
Thus, an impairment must be some type of mental or physiological disorder. A
simple physical characteristic such as blue eyes or blonde hair will not suffice. Feld-
blum, supra note 186, at 13.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). According to the EEOC, "major life activities"
include "caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1992).
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impairment; 9 ' or (3) a reputation as having such impairment. 191
The ADA covers all individuals meeting any one of the above
criteria.
1 92
Most conditions that qualified as "handicaps" under the Rehabili-
tation Act also qualify as "disabilities" under the ADA.19 Three
controversial conditions are AIDS, alcoholism, and drug use.194
The ADA extends coverage to any person with AIDS, or an asymp-
tomatic HIV infection, under the first prong of its definition. 195
Similarly, alcoholics qualify for ADA coverage provided that their
190. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). This prong applies to individuals who either (1)
have a history of an impairment, but are no longer affected by such impairment, or
(2) have been misclassified as having such impairment. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(iii)
(1992).
Examples of the former include heart disease, cancer, and emotional illness. 45
C.F.R. app. A(3) § 84. A leading example of the latter is the misclassification of
mental retardation.
191. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). According to the EEOC, an individual has the
reputation of having such an impairment if: (1) said individual has a mental or physi-
cal impairment which either does not substantially limit a major life activity, or only
limits a major life activity as a result of the attitudes of others; or (2) said individual
is treated as though a major life activity is substantially limited by a mental or physi-
cal impairment, even though such impairment does not exist. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2
(1992). For a more detailed discussion of this topic, see generally Feldblum, supra
note 186, at 17-18.
192. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
193. Examples include hearing, speech, and vision impairments, mental retarda-
tion, emotional disturbances, epilepsy, learning disabilities, diabetes, cancer, cystic
fibrosis, and heart disease. Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Legal Analysis in THE AMERI-
CANs winH DISABILmEs Acr: A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE TO IMPACT, EN-
FORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANcE 77, 82-83 (BNA Special Report 1990)(analyzing
whether these conditions constitute disabilities).
194. See Feldblum, supra note 186, at 20-24 (analyzing whether AIDS, alcholism
and drug use constitute disabilities).
It may be argued that alcoholism and drug use are not "true" disabilities, but
rather curable habits. Inclusion of "habits" within the definition of disability under-
mines a major premise that disabled people do not have the power to rid themselves
of their disability.
Classifying AIDS as a disability is controversial for two reasons. First, it is the
only terminal illness to be expressly included. Second, legislation that forces HIV-
negative individuals to come into contact with HIV-positive individuals will natu-
rally provoke controversy because of the contagious nature of AIDS.
195. See id. at 20. The ADA uses the term "HIV disease," which accurately
covers the entire spectrum of IV-related illnesses, including those who are mistak-
enly perceived to be HIV-positive. Id.
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alcohol dependency either substantially limits, or is perceived as lim-
iting, one or more major life activities. 196
While the ADA expressly excludes illegal drug use from its defini-
tion of disability,"9 there are several exceptions. Any individual
who is participating in a drug rehabilitation program, 98 who has
successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program, 199 or who is
wrongfully regarded as engaging in drug use,200 may qualify as a
disabled individual notwithstanding the above rule.201 Furthermore,
no individual may be denied health services solely on the basis of
current illegal drug use.2'
The ADA's broad definition of "person with a disability" extends
protection to all Americans who meet its criteria.20 3 Any privately
or federally-funded program which appears to discriminate against
the disabled is in direct violation of the ADA.2 4
III. THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HuMAN SERVICES
REJECTION OF THE OBHSA WAIVER APPLICATION
On August 3, 1992, Secretary of Health and Human Services
Louis W. Sullivan denied Oregon's federal waiver request. 20 5 In a
196. Id. at 23. Individuals who only drink alcohol on a casual basis are not cov-
ered because there is no impairment of a major life function due to alcohol depen-
dency. Id
197. 42 U.S.C. § 12210(A) (Supp. IV 1992). "Illegal use of drugs" means the use
of drugs which have been deemed unlawful under the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. § 812), but does not include controlled substances taken under the supervi-
sion of a physician, or any other legal drug. § 12210(d)(1). However, individuals
who abuse legal prescription drugs, such as Valium, are excluded from coverage.
See Feldblum, supra note 186, at 22.




202. 42 U.S.C. § 12210(c) (providing that "notwithstanding subsection (a) ... an
individual shall not be denied health services, or services provided in connection
with drug rehabilitation, on the basis of current illegal use of drugs if the individual
is otherwise entitled to such services.").
203. Feldblum, supra note 186, at 26. Unlike the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
ADA extends coverage to people who associate with disabled individuals. Id. at 25-
26. While the ADA does not limit the type of relationship, claimants must prove
that they were discriminated against because of their association with a disabled
individual. Id. at 26.
204. See supra notes 168-84 and accompanying text for ADA provisions.
205. DHHS REPoRT, supra note 14, at 1.
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letter to Oregon Governor Barbara Roberts, Sullivan cited inconsis-
tencies with the ADA as the primary reason for the waiver denial.20 6
An accompanying Department of Health and Human Services Re-
port (DHHS Report) concluded that OBHSA's prioritization pro-
cess caused the inconsistencies.20 More specifically, the report
disagreed with a basic premise of the prioritization process, that the
value of a life without a disability is greater than the value of a life
with a disability.20 8
The DHHS Report cited two aspects of the OBHSA prioritiza-
tion process which reflected this premise: the telephone survey20 9
and the hand adjustments.21 0 The DHHS Report criticized the qual-
ity of life data acquired from the telephone survey as reflecting ste-
reotypes about disabled individuals. 211 The survey asked a random
sample of Oregonians how they would rate the quality of a life with
certain debilitating conditions.212 Numerous scholars have criticized
this approach as inherently flawed.21 3 They argue that individuals
without disabilities generally undervalue the quality of a life with
some degree of disability.214 OHSC acknowledged the existence of
206. Letter from Louis W. Sullivan, Secretary, Dep't of Health and Human Serv-
ices, to Barbara Roberts, Governor, State of Oregon (Aug. 3, 1992) (on file with the
Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law) [hereinafter
Waiver Rejection Letter]. While Sullivan rejected Oregon's waiver application, he
encouraged Oregon to submit a revised proposal. Id.
207. See supra notes 69-111 and accompanying text for a description of the pri-
oritization process.
208. DHHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 1.
209. Id. at 1; see supra notes 73-82 and accompanying text for a description of
the telephone survey.
210. DHHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 2; see supra notes 112-19 and accompany-
ing text for a description of the hand adjustment process.
211. DHHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 1.
212. The debilitating conditions included paralysis and alcoholism. See supra
note 74 for examples of telephone survey questions.
213. See infra note 214 for some of the scholars' views.
214. See Hadorn, supra note 74, at 12. Hadorn argued that the use of a purely
objective quality of life measurement does not necessarily correspond to the "per-
ceived" quality of life. Id. Furthermore, quality of life judgments are often shaped
by the "social acceptability" of the conditions in question. Id. (citing Warren Reich,
Life: Quality of Life, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIoETHncs 829, 837 (1978)).
See also Menzel, supra note 91, at 22 (arguing that quality of life evaluations of
other peoples' lives are inherently dangerous because of a lack of first hand
knowledge).
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this bias in the OBHSA telephone survey.215 However, it argued
that the telephone survey had a limited impact on the final ranking
of condition/treatment pairs.216
Contrary to OHSC's claims, the DHHS Report found that the im-
pact of the biased telephone survey was quite significant.217 In
reaching this conclusion, the DHHS substituted a constant value in
place of the survey-generated values.21 8 The results were astound-
ing. More than 120 condition/treatment pairs moved 30 places on
the prioritized list.z" 9 Over 50 pairs moved at least 50 places, with
one such pair shifting 161 places.22° These findings indicate that the
biased results of the telephone survey precluded funding for many
condition/treatment pairs that would have otherwise received fund-
ing.22 The DHHS determined that this result unjustly discrimi-
nated against the disabled in violation of the ADA.222
The DHHS Report also found the process of hand adjustments
discriminatory.2' OHSC based these adjustments on community
values,224 including "quality of life ' '22 and "ability to function., 226
According to the DHHS Report, these two values are biased against
215. 1991 CoMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at C-l1 (admitting that"... those who
had experienced the problem did not feel it was as severe as those who had not
experienced the problem.").
216. DHHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 1. See U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECHNOL-
OGY AssEssMEN-r, EVALUATION OF THE OREGON MEDICAID PROPOSAL 186 (1992)
[hereinafter OTA AssEssmENT] (stating that "OTA analysis of the list showed that
the weights from the public survey had relatively little effect on the final rankings").
217. DHHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 1-2.
218. The DHHS substituted a constant value equivalent to a mean score of 50 on
a scale of 0 to 100. Id. at 2. This effectively canceled out the bias of the telephone
survey.
219. Id. at 1-2.
220. Id.
221. The DHHS concluded that "[u]nIess Oregon funds all of the health services
on its prioritized list every year, it is unlikely... that the telephone survey data will
have no effect on which medical conditions are treated." Id.
But see Capron, supra note 68, at 20 (arguing that the process of replacing com-
munity values with a constant would "falsely suggest that anyone, disabled or other-
wise, would regard all possible outcomes as equally beneficial").
222. DHI-S REPORT, supra note 14, at 2. Specifically, the biased effect of the
telephone survey violates Title II of the ADA, which prohibits discrimination in the
administration of public services; see supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Title II.
223. DHHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 2.
224. See supra note 87 and accompanying text for a list of all the values used.
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the disabled because they emphasize restoring health and functional
independence.227
OHSC also moved treatments for "severe or exacerbated condi-
tions" to comparatively unfavorable positions.2' The DHHS re-
jected this methodology as expressly discriminating against the
disabled, claiming that "severe or exacerbated conditions" are virtu-
ally synonymous with the ADA's definition of disability.2 9
The biased telephone survey and hand adjustments resulted in a
prioritized list of condition/treatment pairs" 0 that blatantly discrim-
inated against the disabled in violation of the ADA. 3 The DHHS
Report cited two specific examples: liver transplants and treatment
for low birth weight babies. 2
Although liver transplants for non-alcoholic cirrhosis of the liver
received funding,233 the same treatment for alcoholic patients fell
below the cut off line. 34 Similarly, life support for low birth weight
babies of less than 500 grams and under 23 weeks gestation was not
225. The "quality of life" value derived at the community meetings is defined as
attending to emotional well-being, pain and suffering, independence, and functional
capacity. Garland & Hasnain, supra note 83, at 17.
226. The community value of "ability to function" is defined as restoration of
emotional well-being, productivity, independence, and general quality of life. Id.
227. DHHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 2.
228. 1991 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at 28 (stating that "where severe or
exacerbated conditions were ranked in a relatively favorable condition compared to
prevention of disease, disability or exacerbation, these occurrences were reversed.").
229. DHHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 2; see, e.g., Menzel, supra note 91, at 23
(equating "severe or exacerbated conditions" with disability).
230. See 1991 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at app. i (enumerating prioritized
list of condition/treatment pairs).
231. DHHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 2 (stating that the ranking should be
redone without consideration of the aforementioned community and individual
values).
But see Capron, supra note 68, at 20. Capron argued that the DHHS Report
misrepresents the role of quality of life data in Oregon's prioritization process. Id.
Furthermore, although it may be reasonable to interpret the ADA as prohibiting
any rule which expressly denies health care to a group of people based on disability,
it would be absurd to interpret it as prohibiting the use of "limited health care re-
sources" to treat other conditions first. Id.
232. DHHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 2 (stating that these blatantly discrimina-
tory rankings must be remedied before the OBHSA may be approved).
233. 1991 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at app. J . 366.
234. Id. at 1. 690.
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funded," 5 while life support for low birth weight infants of at least
500 grams was funded. 36 The DHHS found these results violated
Title II of the ADAz37 because the distinctions were based on the
existence of disabling conditions-alcoholism and low birth
weight.2 38
The DHHS Report concluded with several suggestions for revi-
sion of the OBHSA. First, Oregon should reprioritize the list of
condition/treatment pairs without the influence of the biased tele-
phone survey.239 Second, Oregon must revise the hand adjustment
process to eliminate methodology that assigns lower quality of life
ratings based on disability.240 However, Oregon may consider neu-
tral factors such as the cost of medical procedures, prevention of
death, and the length of hospital stays when allocating medical re-
sources. 241 Third, the new plan must remedy blatant examples of
discrimination before the necessary waivers would be granted.242
IV. OREGON'S RESPONSE
The DHHS rejection of Oregon's waiver application shocked
most health care experts, including Oregon state officials.
243
Although Governor Roberts maintained that the original methodol-
235. Id. at 1. 708. Oregon defended this decision with statistics showing that only
one in ten such babies survive, and there is a good chance that the few surviving
babies will be disabled. Shapiro, supra note 64, at 24.
236. 1991 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, app. J 1. 22.
237. See supra notes 172-75 for a discussion of Title H of the ADA. Title I
prohibits discrimination in the administration of public services. Id.
238. DHHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 3; see supra notes 185-203 and accompa-
nying text for the ADA definition of disability.
239. DHHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 2.
240. Id.
241. Id. The DHHS Report states that Oregon may consider "any constant neu-
tral factor that does not take disability into account or that does not have a particu-
lar exclusionary effect on persons with disabilities." Id. at 3. (citing Alexander v.
Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 302 (1985)).
242. DHHS REPORT, supra note 14, at 2-3; see also Federal Government Refuses
to Approve Oregon Medicaid Reform, UPI, Aug. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, UPI File (stating the DHHS conclusion that "a decision not to cover a
treatment based entirely on the existence of a disabling condition, where similarly
situated individuals without that condition would receive treatment, would violate
. the ADA").
243. Menzel, supra note 91, at 21.
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ogy did not violate the ADA,2' OHSC agreed to examine the
OBHSA for any appearance of discrimination.2 45 The result was a
new prioritization process which addressed DHHS concerns.
246
OHSC reordered the list of condition/treatment pairs using an
ADA-compatible analysis. First, OHSC eliminated the telephone
survey data.24 7 The Commission subsequently ranked the list of
condition/treatment pairs according to the effectiveness of treat-
ment.248 To determine the effectiveness of treatment, OHSC relied
on outcome data supplied by medical experts. 249 This data con-
cerned the probability of death, the probability of an asymptomatic
recovery, and the medical cost of treatment.50 OHSC first ranked
condition/treatment pairs on the ability of the treatment to prevent
death. 51 Tied pairs were then ranked based on the treatment's abil-
ity to return the patient to an asymptomatic 252 state of health.5 3
The Commission ranked remaining tied pairs according to the aver-
244. Barbara Roberts, Bush Blows It on Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1992,
at A19 (opinion/editorial). Roberts cited several reasons why the DHHS analysis of
the OBHSA was wrong. First, the OBSHA does not apply to the disabled until
1993. Id. Second, various disability groups within the state of Oregon assisted in the
prioritization process. Id. Finally, the OTA Report found that the OBHSA showed
a preference for prevention and treatment of disabilities. Id.
245. Governor Barbara Roberts, Governor Sends Revised Health Plan to Bush
Administration, News Release (Nov. 13, 1992) (on file with the Washington Univer-
sity Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law) [hereinafter News Release].
246. OHSC REvisioN, supra note 15, at preface.
247. Id. at 2.
248. Id. Effectiveness of treatment was judged under two principles: 1) the
maintenance of life is of primary importance, and 2) an asymptomatic condition is
the most desirable state. Id.
249. ld. at 1.
250. Id. at 1-2. Medical experts were asked to estimate the probability of each of
these factors, both with and without treatment. Id.
251. OHSC REvisIor, supra note 15, at 3.
252. An "asymptomatic state" means a return to the patient's pre-condition
health state, if medically possible. Id. at n.2. It does not necessarily mean perfect
health. Id.
253. Id. at 4. This procedure entailed two steps. First, tied pairs were ranked
according to the ability of the treatment to save a life and subsequently return the
patient to an asymptomatic state of health. Id. If pairs were still tied, they were
ranked on "the treatment's ability to take the patient from a symptomatic to an
asymptomatic state of health." Id.
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age cost of treatment, with the more expensive treatment receiving
lower priority.z 4
OHSC examined the new prioritized list and subsequently hand
adjusted items which seemed out of place 55 Movement of pairs
was rounded to pre-determined groups of twenty-five lines.2 56 The
Commission based its decisions on various considerations, 7 includ-
ing the principle that preventative treatment should be ranked
higher than curative treatment for a given condition 8 Neutral
community values were also used to determine the degree of adjust-
ment for non-life-threatening conditions. 9 These included: mater-
nity care,2 ° general prevention services,26' comfort care,262 and
family planning services. 3 OHSC eliminated all values pertaining
254. Id. Remaining pairs with the same ranking were assigned the same line
number, and ordered alphabetically by diagnosis. Id.
255. Id. For example, cerebral palsy, ALS (Lou Gehrig's disease), and
anencephalous (babies born without a brain) were combined and moved to line 152.
Id. at preface.
Line numbers refer to the ranking of the condition/treatment pair. For example,
Hodgkin's Disease has a rank of 68 out of a total 688 pairs. Id. at app. 1. 68.
256. OHSC REvisION, supra note 15, at 4. For example, maternity care was
moved to the group of lines 50-74. Id.
257. Id. at 4. These considerations included:
1) Prevention before curative treatment;
2) Degree of incongruency with adjacent conditions;
3) Community values in determining placement of non-life-threatening
conditions;
4) Severity of contagious diseases and public health risks;
5) Ranking of cancer treatments according to survival rate after treatment;
and
6) Symptomatic relief for self-limiting conditions.
Id. at 4-5.
258. Id. at 4. For example, dysplasia of the cervix was ranked higher than cancer
of the cervix. Id.
259. Id. at 5. These values were only used to determine the general group place-
ments. Id.
260. Id. at app. ll. 50-74.
261. OHSC REVISION, supra note 15, at app. ll. 125-74.
262. Id. at app. II. 150-74.
263. Id. at app. IL 250-74. These groupifigs were based on community values
including preference for: healthy mothers and babies, comfort care (i.e., pain medi-
cation for terminally ill patients), family planning services, general preventative care,
and high prioritization for contagious diseases. Id at preface.
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to "quality of life" and "ability to function."' After completing
the hand adjustments, the Commission reorganized each group of
twenty-five lines using the above prioritization process.265 The final
list contained 688 condition/treatment pairs.266 The Oregon Legisla-
ture approved funding for the first 568 pairs.267
Unlike the original list,26s the results of the revised prioritization
process do not violate the ADA.26 9 Specifically, the revised list ad-
dresses DHHS concerns regarding liver transplants and low birth
weight babies.270 OHSC combined all liver transplants for cirrhosis
of the liver because the effectiveness of treatment does not depend
on the cause.27' Individuals continuing to engage in the same habits
which damaged the original liver, however, are not eligible for trans-
plants because such activity dramatically decreases the effectiveness
of treatment.272  OHSC also combined treatment for all babies
weighing less than 2,500 grams.273
264. Id. at 1, 6. See supra notes 208-38 and accompanying text for DHHS
criticisms.
265. See supra notes 247-64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Oregon's
revised prioritization process.
266. OHSC REVISION, supra note 15, at preface. The reduction from 709 condi-
tion/treatment pairs to 688 pairs was the result of two OHSC decisions. Id. at 5-6.
First, OHSC merged neuromuscular dysfunction conditions (for which there is no
effective treatment) into a new symptomatic treatment line. Id. at 5. Second, the
OHSC merged lines where the treatment was a continuum of care. Id. at 6.
Before finalizing the list, OHSC held a public hearing where various advocacy
groups testified. Id. at 6. This process resulted in the deletion of two condition/
treatment pairs: End Stage HIV Disease, and Anencephalous and Similar Anoma-
lies and Reduction Deformities of the Brain. Id.
267. Telephone Interview with Gail Wilensky, supra note 128.
268. See 1991 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 9, at app. J. See also supra notes 69-
111 and accompanying text for a discussion of the original prioritization process.
269. Letter from Barbara Roberts, Governor, State of Oregon, to Louis W. Sul-
livan, Secretary, Dep't of Health and Human Services (Nov. 13, 1992) (on file with
the Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law) (stating the
belief of Governor Roberts that the revised prioritization process does not violate
the ADA).
270. See infra notes 274-75 and accompanying text.
271. OHSC REvisrON, supra note 15, at preface, app. 1. 132.
272. Id. at preface; see also Capron, supra note 68, at 20 (proposing a distinction
between potential liver transplant recipients who are alcoholics, and those who have
their alcoholism under control).
273. OHSC REVI SION, supra note 15, at preface, app. 1. 40.
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On November 13, 1992, Governor Roberts submitted the Revised
Oregon Health Plan to the DHHS for waiver approval 4 Although
Roberts was confident that the new prioritization process was en-
tirely consistent with the ADA,27 5 the Bush Administration refused
to make a decision on the resubmitted waiver application.276 Con-
sequently, the fate of the OBHSA passed to the hands of the Clin-
ton Administration.277
V. THE DHHS CONDIONAL WAIVER APPROVAL
On March 19, 1993, the DHHS approved Oregon's waiver appli-
cation, entitled "Oregon Reform Demonstration."'27 The five-year
waivers279 are contingent upon Oregon's compliance with twenty-
nine special terms and conditions,2 80 several of which require fur-
ther revision of the prioritization process.28 First, Oregon must re-
order condition/treatment pairs without considering the treatment's
ability to return the patient to an asymptomatic state. Considera-
274. Letter from Barbara Roberts to Louis W. Sullivan, supra note 269.
275. Governor Roberts said the new rankings reflect "only the degree to which a
particular treatment saved life or returned a person to his or her original health
status without placing a value on that status." Spencer Rich, Oregon Resubmits
Health Plan; Program Revised to Eliminate Bias, HousE CHRON., NOV. 14, 1992, at
A8 [hereinafter Oregon Resubmits].
276. Telephone Interview with Gail Wilensky, supra note 128.
277. Clinton faces a tough decision. As both Governor of Arkansas and a presi-
dential candidate, he vehemently supported the OBHSA. Edwin Chen, Clinton
May Inherit Controversial Oregon Health Plan, L.A. TIM s, Dec. 2, 1992, at A22.
However, Vice President Gore testified against the plan last year, calling it "a horri-
ble mistake." Id. The Children's Defense Fund, formerly chaired by Hillary Clin-
ton, also strongly opposed the OBHSA. Id.
278. Letter from Donna Shalala, Secretary, Dep't of Health and Human Serv-
ices, to Barbara Roberts, Governor, State of Oregon (Mar. 19, 1993) (on file with
the Washington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law); see also Let-
ter from William Toby, Jr., Acting Administrator, HCFA, to Kevin W. Concannon,
Director, Oregon Dep't of Hum. Resources (Mar. 19, 1993) (on file with the Wash-
ington University Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law) [hereinafter Formal
Waiver Acceptance Letter].
279. Although effective from April 1, 1993 to December 31, 1998, the waivers
are subject to annual renewal by the DHHS. Formal Waiver Acceptance Letter,
supra note 278, at 1.
280. Id.; see also id. at enclosure (listing all 29 special terms and conditions).
281. Id. at enclosure.
282. Id. at enclosure, condition 1. Such a requirement would arguably discrimi-
nate against disabled individuals, who are incapable of returning to asymptomatic
states. Id.
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tion of medical effectiveness, however, is permissible when making
hand adjustments. 283 Second, all infertility services2 4 must be
ranked using neutral factors that do not consider disability.285
Third, before denying treatment to any individual, especially indi-
viduals with disabilities, health care providers must determine if the
individual has a condition that qualifies for treatment.286 If so,
treatment for all conditions must be provided.2 1 If not, treatment
must only be provided where the expected outcome is comparable
to that of a funded condition/treatment pair.8 8 All revisions to the
prioritized list are subject to HCFA approval. 89
In response to the DHHS conditional waiver approval, OHSC re-
vised its prioritization process.2 °  Using existing data, OHSC
ranked condition/treatment pairs on the ability of the treatment to
prevent death.29' Tied pairs were ranked according to cost, with
more expensive treatments receiving lower priority.292 Any remain-
ing tied pairs were ordered alphabetically by diagnosis.293 OHSC
considered community values294 when making hand adjustments, 95
which were rounded to groups of twenty-five lines.296 The final pri-
283. Id. at enclosure, condition 1.
284. Formal Waiver Acceptance Letter, supra note 278, at enclosure, condition
2. Coverage of infertility services under the demonstration is optional. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at enclosure, condition 3.
287. Id.
288. Id. at enclosure, condition 3.
289. Formal Waiver Acceptance Letter, supra note 278, at enclosure, condition
5.
290. OREGON HEALTH SERVICES COMM'N, PRIORITIZATION OF HEALTH SERV-
ICES: A REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 15-16 (1993) [hereinafter
1993 COMM'N REPORT].
291. Id. at 16.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 17-18. The community values included: general preventative services;
comfort care; maternity care; family planning services; prevention of a condition
before treatment; medical ineffectiveness; prevention of additional complications;
prevention of future costs; cosmetic services (should not be covered); self-limiting
conditions (should not be covered because treatment is ineffective); congruent con-
ditions (should receive similar priority); and public health risk (prevention of com-
municable diseases is a high priority for the state and federal government). Id.
295. 1993 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 290, at 16, 18.
296. Id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol45/iss1/7
THE 'OREGON PLAN" AND THE ADA
oritized list containing 688 condition/treatment pairs297 was com-
pleted on April 19, 1993.298
VI. PROPOSAL
The OBHSA presents a viable solution to Oregon's health care
problems, and possibly to those of the nation as well.2 99 Implemen-
tation of the OBHSA at the state level will provide a testing ground
for determining the plan's effectiveness, without jeopardizing the
stability of the entire country. If successful in Oregon, the OBHSA
should be implemented at the national level as a realistic solution to
the health care crisis. Although the OBHSA has received the neces-
sary federal waivers, lawsuits over alleged ADA violations may ob-
struct its implementation.
Courts facing this issue should balance the rights of the disabled
with the continued integrity of the OBHSA.m On one side of the
scale is the disabled individual's right to meaningful access to health
care, which is measured by the effectiveness and necessity of treat-
ment. On the other side is the degree to which accommodation
would impair the efficacy of the program. Courts should infer a re-
buttable presumption in favor of the latter because the existence of
a federal waiver implies that the OBHSA is consistent with the
ADA. By adopting the above balancing test, courts could protect
the rights of the disabled quickly and efficiently without severely
impairing the integrity of the OBHSA.
VII. CONCLUSION
Oregon has reconciled potential problems between the OBHSA
and the ADA. The revised prioritization process will provide health
care coverage to ninety-seven percent of Oregon's citizens, without
discriminating against the disabled. If effective, the OBHSA would
present a viable solution to the national health care crisis. Thus, the
fate of millions of uninsured Americans could depend on the
OBHSA.
297. Oregon Resubmits, supra note 275.
298. 1993 COMM'N REPORT, supra note 290, at 16. At the time of publication,
the Oregon Legislature had not determined the funding cut-off line.
299. Colen, supra note 2, at 34.
300. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 300 (1985).
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Unfortunately, lawsuits may hamper the implementation of this
program. Adoption of a balancing test would address inconsisten-
cies between the OBHSA and the ADA without denying the re-
maining population meaningful access to health care.
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